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The purpose of this paper is to review the previous works of political culture and cross-cultural 
psychology in order to establish why we need to introduce such cultural constructs as individualism 
and collectivism in the scientific study of cultural influences on citizens’ political preference and 
behavior. First, this article will advance that the empirical investigation into the implications of 
political culture for the individual level has been largely missing. Second, it will examine previous 
works about individualism and collectivism in order to make a case for how we can enrich the study of 
political culture by taking advantage of interdisciplinary efforts. Third, this paper will propose some of 
the solutions for the political psychological study of individualism and collectivism.  
 





In comparative politics, we need a theoretical framework that facilitates meaningful 
comparisons of politics across countries. Students of political science have advanced 
attitudinal or behavioral, institutional, and cultural frameworks to this end. Except for the 
cultural approach, however, there is a significant theoretical disjuncture that might hinder 
identifying the implications of individual, micro-level findings for aggregate, macro-level 
analysis or vice versa. We have done the division of labor under both macro-level analyses 
and micro-level ones for a long time. This has led to successes in developing sophisticated 
theories based on empirical findings at each level of analysis. However, the gap between 
these two levels needs to be bridged to reap the fruits of such specialization. This article 
proposes that a political culture approach, specifically one based on individualism and 
collectivism, answer the call. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the previous works of political culture and cross-
cultural psychology in order to establish why we need to introduce such cultural constructs 
as individualism and collectivism in the scientific study of cultural influences on citizens’ 
political preference and behavior. First, this article will critically review select political 
culture literature and argue that the empirical investigation into the implications of political 
culture for the individual level has been largely missing. Second, it will examine previous 
works about individualism and collectivism in order to make a case for how we can enrich 
the study of political culture by taking advantage of interdisciplinary efforts. Third, based on 
the critical review of the previous literature on the subject, this paper will propose some of 
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2. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL CULTURE STUDIES 
 
The intellectual interest in political culture is not a modern phenomenon. Since Plato and 
Aristotle, political philosophers have suggested that collective, bonding human psyches 
important for sustaining a political community of any form. In a similar vein, the cycle of 
political change explained in social psychological terms appears recurrently well into the 
nineteenth century. Thus, the general agreement that Almond and Verba’s work (1963) is 
seminal in the study of political culture is attributable to the fact that they made a case for the 
crucial role of political culture or “civic culture” to be exact, for a successful government 
drawing on the empirical analysis of one of the first large scale comparative surveys. 
The empirical inquiry into political culture has its share of ups and downs since its 
introduction to political science in the 1950s. The initial popularity was largely due to its 
more rigorous methodological posture, utilizing statistical analysis of survey data gleaned 
from random samples across multiple countries accompanied by sophisticatedly constructed 
interview schedules, among others. This systematic, quantitative approach to the study of 
political culture was a clear breakaway from a psycho-analytical and anthropological 
“reductionism,” which had dominated the field since the turn of the century. Thus, political 
culture studies in the 1960s and the 1970s contributed to pioneering modern comparative 
politics. They aimed to construct generalizable knowledge about an individual’s political 
behavior in different political regimes based on modern scientific methods and systematic 
comparisons. 
The initial success of empirical political culture studies was eclipsed by academic 
challenges from the neo-Marxist on the left and rational choice advocates on the right. The 
former disputed the objectivity in general, and criticized Western ethnocentric tendencies in 
particular, of political culture studies. The latter discredited them for their atheoretical and 
frequent post-hoc approach that did not acknowledge its fundamental assumption of 
universal rationality. Rational choice theory began dominating in the discipline of political 
science in the late 1970s while the influence of the neo-Marxist criticisms waned to a point 
of insignificance at least in the academic community. 
It is no coincidence that the popularity of modern political culture research declined in 
the same decades. However, the original rationale for the study was still valid as Reisinger 
(1995: 331) forcefully summarized by the question: “how can scholars satisfactorily explain 
cross-national differences in politics without attending to the subjective orientations of the 
societies’ members?” By the late 1980s, such prominent scholars of political culture as 
Wildavsky (1987), Eckstein (1988), and Inglehart (1988), had led a reaction to the criticisms 
and attempted to redress the balance in the field that had been dominated by rational choice 
models and to revive it. 
The signs of the times were also favorable to the movement of “the renaissance of 
culture.” There were a series of historical developments that were not accounted for 
effectively by economic factors alone. The influence of religion and tradition was felt all 
over the world. Changes in the Catholic Church played a major role in the “third wave” of 
democratization. Muslim fundamentalism had become the most important political factor in 
the Islamic world. One cannot explain unprecedented, rapid economic development in East 
Asia without resorting to Confucianism. Moreover, in advanced industrial societies, religion 
and “post-materialist” values had been exerting not only a durable but increasing influence 
on electoral behavior while social class voting had declined markedly (Inglehart, 1988; 




Huntington, 1991; Pye, 1997). All these social phenomena cried for a cultural explanation 
and students of political culture responded both with diverse perspectives and with the help 
of new technical and empirical capabilities. 
Inglehart (1990; 1997) and Inglehart and Baker (2000), for example, first empirically 
reconfirmed the validity of the basic thesis of The Civic Culture and refuted economic 
determinism and “linear” modernization theory. He made a cogent argument that political 
culture is a crucial intervening variable in the long-term relationship between economic 
development and the emergence of mass democracy and that it is a central factor in the 
survival of democracy. Putnam (1993; 2000) is another successor to the tradition of The 
Civic Culture and responsible for the renaissance of the study of political culture in the 
recent decades. His quest for an answer for what it would take to make a good democracy led 
him to examine cultural variations within two countries, Italy (1993) and the United States 
(2000). His answer lied in the theory of social capital or “social networks and the associated 
norms of reciprocity,” which has produced numerous policy as well as academic debates 
since. Huntington also made a significant contribution to the revival of political culture 
research, especially after the fall of communism. He summarily hypothesized, “In the post-
Cold war world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, 
or economic. They are cultural… the most important groupings of states are no longer the 
three blocks of the Cold War but rather the world’s seven or eight major civilizations” (1996: 
21, italics is added). Although his broad-brush treatment of cultural zones and adversarial 
view based on anecdotal evidence invited much criticism from diverse disciplines, it surely 
enriched the field of political culture by escalating again the role of culture in world conflicts 
as well as in modernization or civilization to a point of scholarly contention. 
Recent political culture research has geared toward more global issues and perspectives, 
armed with even more data sources accumulated over a longer period of time across 
countries. Harrison and Huntington (2000), for example, gathered for the “Cultural Values 
and Human Progress” symposium prominent experts on such diverse topics as the link 
between values and progress, the universality of values and Western “cultural imperialism,” 
geography and culture, the relationship between culture and institutions, and cultural change. 
According to Harrison (2000), despite the lack of consensus on the topics, the participants 
agreed that cultural values and attitudes are an important and neglected factor in “human 
progress” and hence called for “a comprehensive theoretical and applied research program 
with the goal of integrating value and attitude change into development policies, planning, 
and programming in Third World countries and in anti-poverty programs in the United 
States” (2000, xxxii). 
Inglehart has also expanded his lifetime perspective on political culture to “the theory of 
human development” with the colleagues in psychology as well as in political science. He 
first formulated the theory with Welzel (2003) and elaborated on it with “the human 
development syndrome” with Oyserman (2004) and “the human development sequence” 
with Welzel (2005). His recent co-authored work addressed the relationship among 
development, freedom, and happiness (Inglehart et al., 2008). Based on the World Values 
Surveys, which now spans almost three decades and covers the majority part of the world, 
these authors attempt to demonstrate that socioeconomic development, emancipative cultural 
change and democratization constitute a coherent syndrome of social progress. This cultural 
pattern or “human development syndrome” as they put it, has been universal in its presence 
across nations and cultural zones and as a whole contributed to broadening human choice 
and freedom. 
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In sum, the history of political culture research is as old as the history of comparative 
politics. Since the turn of the century when modern political science began to establish itself 
as an independent academic field, the popularity of political culture research as one of the 
major approaches to understand political behavior across nations and cultural zones has 
waxed and waned. In the recent decades, the political culture approach has invited renewed 
interests with global policy concerns as well as favorable research environments. The 
political culture approach has now been considered one of the two viable scientific 
paradigms along with rational choice theory in political science (Wildavsky, 1987; Eckstein, 
1988; Inglehart, 1990; Ross, 1997; Fuchs, 2007). 
 
 
3. BRING THE INDIVIDUAL BACK IN POLITICAL CULTURE 
 
There have probably been as many critics as defenders of political culture studies. This 
section, however, will focus only on the aspect of political culture research that has 
motivated an inquiry into psychological implications of political culture. That is, existing 
political culture research, especially in the recent decades, has not paid due attention to the 
implications of political culture for the psychology of the individual whose political attitude 
and belief system constitutes, shapes, and is affected by, political culture. I observe that the 
neglect of the political psychology approach in the study of political culture is reflected in 
the definitions and the subsequent empirical approach dominant in the empirical study of 
political culture. 
 
3.1 Psychological Definitions of Political Culture without Psychology 
 
Culture and its particular type, political culture, have been typically defined and studied 
as a macro-phenomenon.
2
  For example, Elkins and Simeon (1979) advanced that political 
culture is “the property of a collectivity” such as nation, region, class, ethnic community, 
formal organization, and so on. According to the authors, individuals do not have cultures 
but attitudes, beliefs, and values. They argued that we must develop precise means of 
identifying the culture-bearing unit in different situations in order to refine its utility as an 
explanatory concept beyond a descriptive category. Hofstede concurred by claiming that 
“culture presupposes a collectivity” (2001: 5) and defined it as “the collective programming 
of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from another” (2001: 
9) and used similar definitions in his other works including the first edition of Culture’s 
Consequences (1980). Triandis cited in several works a renowned anthropologist 
Kluckhohn’s definition that “culture is to society what memory is to individuals” and 
elaborated that “it includes what has worked in the experience of a society, so that it was 
worth transmitting to future generations” (Triandis and Suh, 2002: 135). 
In fact, there have existed “psychological or subjective definitions” of political culture 
                                                          
2 In this paper, I do not intend to conceptually distinguish political culture from culture except that the 
former involves political objects and processes while the latter human affairs in general, subsuming 
the former as a field of study. Almond and Verba (1963: 12) made a similar distinction: “We speak of 
a political culture just as we can speak of an economic culture or a religious culture. It is a set of 
orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes.” For a comprehensive conceptual 
distinction between political culture and culture, see Pye (1965: 8-9) and Verba (1965: 521-525). 




that draw on such psychological terms as orientation, attitude, affect, cognition, feeling, 
evaluation, and so forth. Almond and Verba, for example, presented that political culture 
“refers to the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its 
various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (1963, 12, italics added).  
We can find another typical example of psychological definitions in Verba’s work. He 
defined culture as “the system of beliefs about patterns of political interaction and political 
institutions” (1965: 516, italics added) and those beliefs are fundamental, usually unstated, 
and unchallengeable, assumptions or postulates about politics. 
Even these psychological definitions, however, have not been intended to refer to 
psychology at the individual level but psychology of a collectivity. Almond and Verba, 
pioneer of the “individual-oriented” political culture approach was not an exception. 
Immediately after they offered a psychological definition, they elaborated on the political 
culture of a society as “the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and 
evaluations of its population” (1963: 13) and this is the working definition for the five nation 
comparative survey study. Moreover, Inglehart who initiated the renaissance of political 
culture studies in the 1980s defined political culture in a similar fashion: “the subjective 
aspect of a society’s institutions, the beliefs, values, knowledge, and skills that have been 
internalized by the people of a given society, complementing their external systems of 
coercion and exchange” (1997: 15). Harrison and Huntington also defined culture “in purely 
subjective terms as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions 
prevalent among people in a society” (2000: xv, italics added). Thus, a definition of political 
culture has been considered psychological to the extent that it involves psychological 
constructs regardless of the reference levels, that is, the individual or the aggregate.  
The notion of political culture as a psychological attribute of collectivities, however, 
seems to have precluded its core constituent element, the individual, in subsequent research. 
The implications of this dismissal can be identified at least in two aspects: (1) the lack of 
elaboration on psychological implications (2) the preference for a macroexplanation.  
First, the relationship between political culture of a collectivity and other psychological 
constructs at the individual level, which is a crucial part of psychological definitions of 
political culture, has not been well specified. The effects of political culture on the individual 
are frequently posited in a definition but without much elaboration. Moreover, they are rarely 
subject to operationalization or to rigorous empirical testing. 
Since Almond and Verba, students of political culture studies have rather casually used 
and expanded such psychological terms as attitude, orientation, belief, affect, feeling, 
cognition, value, and so on, often as components of political culture. But at the same time, 
they have often conceptualized these psychological constructs as consequences of culture, 
explicitly or otherwise, even in the same work. Almond and Powell (1978: 25), for instance, 
defined political culture “as the set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about politics current in 
a nation at a given time” and suggested that “the attitude patterns that have been shaped in 
past experience have important constraining effects on future political behavior.” Although 
they acknowledged Barry’s criticism (1970) on the lack of specification of causal mechanism 
in political cultural analysis and introduced such psychological terms as “attitude 
consistency” or “issue constraint,” the authors did not expound the causal mechanism 
between attitude and behavior, which has been one of the central problems in Western 
psychology. 
Elkins and Simeon, who explicitly dismissed the idea of culture as a property of 
individual, also put forward “constraining effects” of political culture on the individual’s 
 KWANG-IL YOON 50 
 
cognition. They presented political culture as “a short-hand expression for a “mind-set” 
which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, 
problems, and solutions which are logically possible” (1979: 128) yet did not elaborate on 
how political culture affects our attention. Almond (1980: 26) once advanced “the 
explanatory power of political culture variables is an empirical question, open to hypothesis 




Second, the primacy of collectivity in political culture research has facilitated 
macroexplanation that “one social pattern, structure, or entity is explained by reference to 
other social phenomena” (Little, 1991: 183). Fuchs (2007: 163), for example, advanced as 
one of the paradigmatic cores of the political culture research program that political culture 
must be considered as a macro-phenomenon so that it can feasibly influence another macro-
phenomenon of regime persistence. 
The preference for macroexplanation, as with other tendencies in the empirical study of 
political culture, began with The Civic Culture, where Almond and Verba attempted to 
identify political culture congruent with democratic political system. We can also find other 
types of macroexplanation in political culture research in the works of Inglehart (1990; 1997) 
and Inglehart and Baker (2000) that have traced cultural value changes among the people of 
the world from traditional, survival culture to secular-rational, self-expression culture 
following the system level socio-economic changes; Huntington (1996) who predicted the 
post-Cold War conflicts based on major civilizations; Putnam (2000) who explained the 
performance of the state governments of the United Stated based on the stock of social 
capital of each state; Welzel and his colleagues (2003) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) that 
have attempted to identify human development syndrome, among others. 
However, we can rarely find the empirical studies of political culture that examine the 
cultural implications for an individual’s political attitude despite increasing accumulation of 
survey data across nations. Indeed, the political culture approach so far has focused on the 
cultural linkage with various macro-socioeconomic and political phenomena such as 
democratization, stability and survival of democracy, economic development, conflicts 
among nations, human development, and so forth, but largely neglected the cultural 
implications for political psychology of the individual. Hence, we do not have enough 
information how the individuals in different cultures think and respond to the issues relevant 
to politics. In other words, we have not explicitly tested the idea that political culture affects 
political attitude and behavior or more broadly political psychology of the individual. 
 
3.2 Issues in the Individualistic Approach to Political Culture 
 
Granted, there is a strand of empirical work in political culture research classified as the 
individual-oriented, psychological approach to political culture. Reisinger (1995: 330) 
                                                          
3 By contrast, the cultural effects on individual psychology have been extensively studied empirically 
as well as theoretically in cultural and cross-cultural psychology. For example, culture is 
conceptualized as meta-schema or foundational schema (Oyserman et al., 2002b). It is also shown that 
culture often determines self-construal and subsequent psychological functioning (Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991), emotion (Kitayama and Markus, 1994), value (Triandis, 1995), personality (Triandis, 
2002), and cognition (Nisbett, 2003). However, existing literature in these fields have not addressed 
the cultural effects on political psychology of the individual. 




observed that most of recent defenders of political culture study fall within the individualistic, 
survey-based approach and it grew largely from the Almond’s work. One should, however, 
note that the dominant approach in political culture, as he conceptualized, has not been 
individualistic if cross-national and has been liable to make a flawed inference about the 
aggregate cultural groups if in fact individual-oriented as true to its name. 
First, drawing on the individual level survey responses does not make the political culture 
approach individual-oriented or psychological as Reisinger and others suggested. As 
discussed above, the preference for macroexplanation in political culture research has led to 
using survey data aggregated to a country, which is the major unit of analysis in the field. 
Thus, survey-based cross-culture studies that these authors referred to as examples of the 
individualistic approach would be, in fact, better understood as aggregate, especially if these 
studies made cross-national comparisons. Second, the individualistic approach that aims to 
make a “cross-level” inference without utilizing information at the aggregate level is 
vulnerable to “individualistic” fallacy, as Inglehart and others have pointed out. 
Individualistic fallacy refers to the incorrect assumption that one can draw aggregate-level 
conclusion from individual-level findings because an individual level relationship represents 
similar strength and direction at the aggregate level. Welzel and Inglehart (2007) advanced 
that the danger of making the fallacy pervades the entire political culture literature as most 
political culture studies examine the individual level determinants of attitudes that are 
assumed to have an impact at the societal level. In other words, aggregating individual level 
responses for cross-cultural comparison does not constitute individualistic fallacy but making 
a fallacious inference about properties or relationships at the aggregate level solely based on 
the individual level data does. This has often been the case in political culture research 
(Peters, 1998; Inglehart and Welzel, 2003; Welzel and Inglehart, 2007). 
In sum, political cultural effects on the individual have frequently been posited in a 
theory of political culture without proper elaboration or being subject to empirical testing. 
And the relationship between political culture and other macro socio-economic phenomena 
has been the dominant subject of the field. Furthermore, the individual-oriented approach to 
political culture has been incomplete in the sense that it has been either in fact a society-
centered study if comparative or a series of within-country studies if individualistic. 
I do not claim that we should redefine or approach culture as the psychological attribute 
of the individual nor the psychological definition and the comparative individualistic 
approach is superior to other society-oriented definitions and approaches. In addition, I do 
not intend to develop the microexplanation that culture must be explained by the individual, 
as advocates of methodological individualism would advance (Lukes, 1973). I maintain, 
however, that a study of political cultural implications at the individual level is long overdue, 
despite increasing accumulation of survey data across nations. Fortunately, we have a body 
of research in cultural and cross-cultural psychology we can draw on for this purpose. 
 
 
4. WHY INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM? 
 
Culture is usually reserved for societies – e.g., nations, ethnic or regional groups within 
or across nations, and various social organizations, as discussed above. In contrast, political 
attitude, preference, beliefs, and behavior are often reserved for the individual. Thus, in order 
to understand the way culture relates to the individual, we first need to specify dimensions of 
cultural variation (Triandis et al., 1988: 323 italics added). In fact, the identification of 
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dimensions of culture has been suggested as a major goal in cross-cultural psychology. 
According to Leung and Bond (1989), one must first be able to link observed cultural 
differences to specific dimensions of culture that are hypothesized to have produced the 
differences in order to build a truly universal theory in psychology that takes into account the 
influence of culture. 
Psychologists who are interested in the cultural implications for the individual’s 
psychological functioning seem to have agreed upon the most important dimensions of 
cultural difference, that is, individualism and collectivism. According to Oyserman and her 
colleagues, a major thrust of cultural psychology in the past two decades has been based on 
modeling culture in terms of differences across groups in levels of individualism and 
collectivism (Oyserman et al., 2002b: 111). Indeed, Triandis and his associates’ work (1988) 
“Individualism and Collectivism: Cross-cultural Perspectives on Self-Ingroup Relationships” 
has been chosen as one of the studies that changed the discipline of psychology (Hock, 2001). 
Then, how could students of political culture who attempt to analyze the cultural effects 
on the individual benefit from the academic achievements by the neighboring discipline? To 
answer this question, I will critically review select psychology literature, both theoretical and 
empirical, on these important cultural dimensions in the following section.  
 
4.1 Utilities of Individualism and Collectivism as Cultural Dimensions 
 
Among several potential cultural dimensions that help us organize such diverse 
psychological constructs as attitude, behavior, affect, cognition, values, and so forth, of the 
individuals, what is so special about individualism and collectivism? 
For practical reasons, one should begin with Huntington’s observation. Huntington 
(1996) predicted, as discussed above, that the major world conflicts after the Cold War 
would occur along the “cultural fault lines separating civilizations” and suggested that the 
difference between individualist Western cultures and collectivist non-Western cultures 
would constitute major cleavages. Triandis (1995: 13-15) concurred and elaborated. He 
claimed that about 70 percent of the world population is collectivist and many in these 
groups disagree with individualism of Western civilizations. With the end of the Cold War, 
the contact between these two adversarial cultural groups has been increasing as the former 
Communist countries began to open their borders and changed from totalitarian, command 
economies, supposedly favorable to collectivism, to market economies, supposedly favorable 
to individualism. In addition, ongoing rapid globalization that has been making the world 
smaller and smaller with unprecedented technological development in mass communication 
and transportation has facilitated the interaction, virtual as well as actual, between 
individualists and collectivists. Thus, the potential for different kinds of world conflicts has 
risen, too. Based on these down-to-earth observations of the socio-economic, political 
transformation in the world, culturalists has demanded a better understanding of those 
opposing cultural frames. 
Theoretically, culture-oriented psychologists has advocated individualism and 
collectivism as essential for scientific development of the field of cross-cultural and cultural 
psychology. For example, cultural psychologists have maintained that individualism and 
collectivism clarify fuzzy constructs of culture and facilitate a direct linkage of psychological 
mechanism at the individual level to a cultural dimension at the aggregate level by 
conceptualizing and operationalizing parallel constructs at both levels of analysis. In addition, 
they have argued that individualism and collectivism offer more parsimonious, coherent, and 




empirically testable dimensions of cultural variation by providing the field with an 
organizing theme and focus for prediction and investigation. These cultural constructs also 
allow productive integration of knowledge accumulated in diverse fields of studies including 
anthropology, psychology, and political science, among others (Triandis et al., 1988; Kim, 
1994; Hofstede, 2001; Oyserman et al., 2002b; Oyserman and Uskul, 2008). 
In sum, the world after the Cold War has called for the renewed interests in individual 
and collectivism, two opposing cultural frames deemed as a major new source of the world 
conflict in the future. With rapid globalization and the regime change of the Soviet system, 
the interaction between two cultural views is ever increasing and a proper understanding of 
individualism and collectivism is needed. Theoretically, these dimensions have been 
advanced as the basic organizing principles of cultures that should be utilized in scientific 
model building in psychology. 
 
 
5. THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM  
 
In a marked contrast with previous cultural research that is characterized by the 
relativistic, ethnographic approach among others, Hofstede’s work aimed to build a scientific 
model of culture drawing on the empirical analysis of the extensive survey of the individuals 
from a large number of countries. It greatly facilitated empirical, cultural and cross-cultural 
research in subsequent decades by providing four overarching cultural patterns identified 
from the cross-national survey data. 
Hofstede’s empirical model of culture consists of the five dimensions identified from the 
factor analysis of the national average scores of employees’ ratings of workplace relevant 
values.
4
 Individualism and collectivism (IDV), a central focus in his first edition, is one of 
these organizing cultural dimensions and defined as follows: 
 
Individualism stands for a society in which ties between individuals are loose: everyone is 
expected to look after him/herself and her/his immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a 
society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, 
which throughout people’s life time continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty (Hofstede, 2001: 225). 
 
As illustrated from the definition and methodology to identify the cultural dimensions, 
Hofstede’s analysis of culture is ecological. In other words, he defined those cultural frames 
with reference to an aggregate not individuals as he did for culture and explicitly studied the 
origins and consequences of these cultural dimensions at the same aggregate level (e.g., 
national wealth, educational and political systems). In addition, one should note that he did 
not view individualism and collectivism as separate dimensions. That is, low IDV means 
high collectivism and high IDV means low collectivism.  
This path-breaking analysis has its own drawbacks: First, the definition of individualism 
and collectivism is simplistic, centering on the relationship between the individual and in-
group, i.e., whether individual is independent of or dependent on his or her in-groups. It 
                                                          
4 The other dimensions include power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. In the second 
edition (2001), Hofstede added the fifth dimension, long-term vs. short-term orientation based on the 
expanded dataset. 
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appears that it has to do with the fact that the dimension was derived empirically not 
theoretically. Second, as a macroexplanation, it could not explain the attitude and behavior of 
the individuals. Indeed, Hofstede acknowledged that his work in fact did not intend to do so, 
arguing that a different unit of analysis, that is, individual or aggregate, requires a 
theoretically distinct approach to avoid “ecological fallacy” in his case. He advanced that in 
general we should not confuse the within-system relationship with the ecological, between-
system relationship. This amounts to the fallacy the possibility of which increases when one 
infers properties or relationships at the individual level solely based on the aggregate level 
data. 
Hofstede’s macro-analysis of individualism and collectivism has been followed by a host 
of the individual level analysis of the cultural frames, initiated by Triandis and his associates. 
The changes in academic focus on the level of analysis may have to do with the fact that the 
implementation of Hofstede’s method is extremely time and resource intensive and that 
attention has shifted to the ways cultural frames affect individuals (Oyserman et al., 2002a). 
Among the numerous contributions Triandis made to cross-cultural psychology, there are 
three important ones that are worthy of note. First, he refined Hofstede’s aggregate-centered 
definition of individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL) both conceptually and empirically. 
He reported that the different methods of measuring these cultural syndromes converge 
(Triandis et al., 1990) and provide four defining attributes that distinguish them: (1) The 
definition of self is interdependent in COL and independent in IND (2) Personal and 
communal goals are closely aligned in COL and not at all aligned in IND (3) Cognition focus 
that guides much of social behavior includes norms, obligations, and duties in COL and 
attitudes, personal needs, rights, and contracts in IND (4) An emphasis on relationships, even 
when disadvantageous, is common in COL while the emphasis is on rational analyses of the 
advantages and disadvantages of maintaining a relationship in IND (Triandis, 1995). Triandis 
also conceptualized and measured collectivism independently as opposed to Hofstede and 
emphasized the “target-specific” nature of collectivism. He observed that collectivism is 
better construed as concern for a certain subset of people and interpersonal relationships – 
e.g., excluding strangers and foreigners – rather than as concern for the entire universe of 
human being (Hui and Triandis, 1986; Triandis et al., 1988).  By this narrow specification, 
Triandis removed the normative aspect of collectivism but reminded the need for a clear 
operationalization of the construct. 
Second, Triandis explicitly distinguished the two different levels of analysis, individual 
and aggregate, and tried to link them by formulating personality attributes variables 
corresponding to the cultural syndromes, that is, idiocentric for individualism and allocentric 
for collectivism, and utilizing the dimensional approach (Triandis, 1995). This 
methodological ingenuity is significant because it suggested the way we incorporate these 
cultural constructs of both levels of analysis in the same model and has facilitated the 
investigation of the implications of the variations in a dimension at one level of analysis for 
the other level, which subsequent empirical analyses on the subject need to follow. 
Third, Triandis and his fellow scholars made a significant contribution to the way 
empirical analysis of culture chooses and frames the subjects of investigation. In a sense, he 
pioneered and established the psychological study of individualism and collectivism, that is, 
the study of how these cultural syndromes affect the psychology of the individual. Examples 
of the subjects include the influences of individualism and collectivism on self-concept 
(Triandis, 1989), social behavior (Triandis et al., 1990), well-being (Suh et al., 1998), and 
personality (Triandis and Suh, 2002). It is worthy of note, however, that Triandis largely 




speculated the implications of these cultural syndromes for politics and that the focus was on 
the political system, not on the individual psychology.  
Schwartz expanded the horizon of the field by putting individualism and collectivism in 
the context of the basic human values. His original intention to study individualism and 
collection was to refine the then-dominant definitions of these cultural constructs by Triandis, 
which are characterized by the defining attributes discussed above. In doing so, Schwartz 
drew on his universal values framework he had developed and has continued to do (Schwartz, 
1990; Schwartz, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2010). 
Defining values as “desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as 
guiding principles in people’s lives” (Schwartz and Bardi, 2001: 269), Schwartz advanced 
that there exist ten universal value types on the individual level he confirmed empirically 
based on a series of large-scale cross-national surveys. Based on the criterion of “whose 
interests it serves,” he classified these motivational goals into individual type values, which 
“serve the self-interests of the individual, not necessarily at the expense of any collectivity” 
and collective type ones, 
 
which “focus on promoting the interests of others” but again does 
not necessarily ask for individual’s sacrifice. For example, values such as hedonism, 
achievement, self-direction, social power, and stimulation are classified into individual type 
values while values such as prosocial, restrictive conformity, security, and tradition, are 
classified into collective types. He determined that maturity values belong to both types 
because they “serve both individual and collective interests” (Schwartz, 1990). 
Despite this largely dichotomous classification of universal value types, Schwartz made a 
strong case against it. The dichotomy of individualism and collectivism, argued Schwartz 
(1990), leads one to overlook values that inherently serve both IND and COL (e.g., wisdom), 
ignores values that foster the universal goals of collectivities other than in-group (e.g., 
universal values such as equality and social justice), and promote the mistaken assumption 
that IND and COL values each form coherent syndromes in polar opposition. Moreover, he 
did not assume that individual and collective interests necessarily conflict, as illustrated from 
the value type classification. 
Granted, the first two rationales call for more rigorous definitions of the constructs, 
which Triandis appears to have agreed. As discussed above, Triandis attempted to rid 
normative aspects of IND and COL and emphasized the target-specific nature of the latter. In 
addition, Triandis (1995) recognized the third rationale, namely, the possibility of 
orthogonality of these cultural syndromes.  
 There are two other points that Schwartz made needs to be addressed here: First, he 
warns against post-hoc interpretation of empirical analyses of IND and COL at both levels of 
analysis and puts an emphasis on the theory-based, a priori specification of the cultural 
dimensions. Schwartz claimed that he derived those individual level universal values and 
cultural value orientations – e.g., autonomy vs. embeddedness, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy, 
and harmony vs. mastery – a priori instead of relying on ecological factor analysis as 
Hofstede did. One can easily agree that a barefoot, post hoc empirical analysis would lead us 
nowhere because any outcome of the analysis should be wide open to interpretation. Second, 
he maintained that the individual and cultural levels must be distinguished for both 
conceptual and empirical purposes. He emphasized that whether or not different values at the 
individual level or other cultural level values go together at each level would depend upon 
the factors operative at each level. For example, it would not be easy to find an individual 
who endorses the value of being humble and of authority at the same time. Yet a nation in 
which there is strong average endorsement for authority tends to be the one in which there is 
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strong average endorsement of being humble. In a nation characterized by a hierarchical 
culture, there should be a large number of people who value authority and a large number of 
other people who value being humble. 
Both Hofstede and Triandis have also acknowledged the need of separate approaches 
depending on the level of analysis but it is Schwartz who carried them out based on a large-
scale cross-cultural surveys. Schwartz extended his individual level value framework to the 
cultural level analysis of “prevailing value emphases” and presented a separate, quasi-
circumplex value structure for each level of analysis. He also distinguished and confirmed 
empirically different factors operating at each level that affect values at the corresponding 
level.  
In sum, Schwartz’s work has allowed us to acknowledge the need to approach culture 
from both levels of analysis, based on a priori theory, in order to gain a fuller understanding 
of the subject. We now appreciate the fact that cultural logic is different from individual 
logic. The question is how we should incorporate separate analyses into a meaningful whole, 
utilizing the results from both levels. 
Finally, Inglehart and Oyserman (2004) offered an integrative analysis of the works of 
Hofstede, Triandis, and Schwartz. They successfully demonstrated that Hofstede’s IDV, 
Triandis’ individualism-collectivism, Schwartz’s autonomy-embeddedness, and the first 
author’s self-expression-survival value dimension significantly overlap both conceptually 
and empirically. Focusing on survival/self-expression values, these authors advanced the one 
dimension that not only has been measured over a longer periods of time but also can help 
integrate all these disparate dimensions into a meaningful theoretical framework. In fact, 
Inglehart and Oyserman confirmed that only one dimension emerged from Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and it accounted for fully 78% of the cross-national variance of 
those cultural dimensions. This dimension is remarkably robust emerging with the different 
measurement approaches, different types of samples, and different time periods. Thus, 
Inglehart and Oyserman made a cogent case that these cultural dimensions, independently 
identified by Hofstede, Triandis and Inglehart, tap similar underlying construct that reflects 
the extent to which people give top priority to autonomous, individual choice over survival 
needs. 
In sum, Inglehart and Oyserman’s work made a significant contribution in the 
psychological study of culture in that it illustrated the way how students of culture integrate 
disparate works into a meaningful theoretical whole both theoretically and empirically and 
how we can take advantage of data resources collected over a long period of time to 
investigate the antecedents and consequences of cultural shift, which should constitute one of 
the most important research agendas in cross-cultural psychology in the future. 
 
5.1 Oyserman’s Meta-Analysis of Individualism and Collectivism 
 
Oyserman and her associates has done so far the most comprehensive review of the 
empirical studies of individualism and collectivism in their “Rethinking Individualism and 
Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analysis” (2002a), which 
covers more than 250 different studies from 1980 to 1999. This broad, meta-analysis 
attempted to answer two crucial questions tackled by a wide variety of approaches and 
methods from existing literature in the field: Are European Americans higher in 
individualism and lower in collectivism than people from other societies?
 
Are theoretically 
derived implications of individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL) for psychological 




functioning in the domains of self-concept, well-being, attribution style, and relationally, 
borne out in the empirical literature?  
The authors began the analysis by providing an overview of IND and COL as cultural 
orientations. Instead of offering alternative definitions of IND and COL, they present 
theoretical core elements of each construct and elaborate on the constructs based on existing 
operational definitions. That is, the core element of IND is the assumption individuals are 
independent of one another while that of COL is the assumption that groups bind and 
mutually obligate individuals. Based on the content analysis of  the items that make up 
twenty seven available IND-COL scales, they identify seven components of IND such as 
independent, striving for one’s own goals, personal competition and wining, focus on one’s 
uniqueness, thought and actions private from others, knowing oneself and having a strong 
identity, and clearly articulating one’s needs and eight COL components such as considering 
close others an integral part of the self, wanting to belong to groups, duties and scarifies, 
concern for group harmony, seeking advice for decision, self changes according to context, 
focus on hierarchy and state issues, and a preference for group work. According to the 
authors, these components or domains account for 88% of items across each of the scales 
included in the analysis, which illustrates that they are core elements of the existing 
empirical definitions of IND and COL. 
As for the first question, the answer is complicated than expected. On the one hand, 
Americans are individualists as defined by their response to IND scales and the way they 
define themselves, and what evidence they find convincing and motivating. On the other 
hand, it is equally clear that they are relational and feel close to group members, seeking 
their advice, all of which represent collectivistic aspects. The answer for the second question 
is not so definite that there is not enough evidence for the need for multiple psychologies 
rather than a single, general psychology. In other words, observed psychological effects
5
 of 
IND and COL tend not to be large and not to be replicated. In addition, focus on either a 
particular country comparison or a particular aspect of psychological functioning in a 
broader domain jeopardizes the generalizability of the findings of the studies. 
In answering these questions, this comprehensive study highlights two problems of 
previous studies of individualism and collectivism. First, one cannot help notice that there 
has been a notable absence of the studies that examine psychological implications of these 
cultural constructs in the domain of political psychology. Among the large number of studies 
included in the meta-analysis, one can hardly find a study that either analyzes cultural 
influence on the individual attitude or behavior directly relevant to political issues or 
explores political psychological implications of the findings. As discussed in the section 
above, there have been the renewed interests in political culture for theoretical and practical 
reasons. Yet macroexplanation – that is, culture affects macro socio-economic phenomena – 
has been dominant at least in political science. This may have to do with the tendency of the 
discipline, especially in comparative politics, that focuses on macro political, socio-economic 
outcomes and choose a country as the unit of analysis. Thus, it is remarkable that a study that 
examines political psychological implications of individualism and collectivism is yet to be 
done even in the field of cross-cultural psychology, where academic focus has been on the 
way cultural frames influence individuals (Oyserman et al., 2002a). 
                                                          
5 The effects in the meta-analysis refer to main effect, i.e., size and direction of differences in IND-
COL and moderator effects, i.e., to what extent, scale reliability, scale content, and sample 
composition influence size and direction of main effect differences. 
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Second, there is an issue of external validity in the current culture oriented psychological 
studies of individualism and collectivism, as Oyserman and her associates acknowledged. 
One would be hard pressed to justify that the findings could be generalizable to the real 
world when most dataset were collected from undergraduates and worse from 2-3 countries. 
According to Oyserman et al. (2002a: 6), over 80% of studies in the meta-analyses used 
undergraduates and the bulk of cross-national research comes from comparisons of American 
undergraduates that supposedly represent the West with undergraduates from Japan, Hong 
Kong, China, or Korea that supposedly represent the East. This may be attributable to the 
fact that they selected the studies based on such explicit keywords as individualism, 
collectivism, independence, interdependence, allocentrism, and idiocentrism, which should 
have narrowed the scope of the analysis. 
 
 
6. THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COLLECTIVISM 
 
In the final section, I will propose some of the solutions that we need to take advantage of 
for the study of political psychological implications of individualism and collectivism. They 
include multilevel analysis, rigorous conceptualization and operationalization of 
individualism and collectivism based on the level of analysis, and extensive use of cross-
national, representative survey data. 
 
6.1 Level of Analysis and Multilevel Analysis 
 
Many cross-cultural psychologists since Hofstede have argued that different levels of 
analysis, that is, individual or cultural, need to be distinguished for theoretical as well as for 
empirical purposes. Hofstede who carried out the county level analysis of individualism and 
collectivism emphasized that his “ecological” or aggregate analysis should not be used to 
explain individual psychology. Theoretically, argued he, “cultures are not king-size 
individuals: They are wholes, and their internal logic cannot be understood in terms used for 
personality dynamics of individuals” (2001: 17). Empirically, he made an arguable claim to 
the effect that cross-level inferences would lead to a fallacy of one kind or another, that is, 
ecological fallacy or reverse ecological (individualistic) fallacy. In a sense, Hofstede justified 
the reason why he focused on the country-level cultural analysis. 
Triandis agreed with Hofstede in the sense that he advanced different terminology – i.e., 
allocentric and idiocentric as personality attributes of collectivism and individualism, 
respectively – distinguish the individual level analysis from the cultural level one. Triandis, 
however, has focused on the individual level analysis without systematically incorporating 
the information at the cultural level except for review works (1989; 1995). In addition, he 
approached the issue of level of analysis as a “measurement” issue rather than the one of 
incorporating the information gained at either level of analysis (Triandis, 1995). 
Schwartz also acknowledged the importance of distinguishing levels of analysis in 
gaining a complete perspective on culture. He conceptualized and tested empirically separate 
value structures at each level of analysis and then related relevant individual level universal 
values and cultural value orientations to corresponding aspects of individualism and 
collectivism. By doing separate analyses and hence focusing on the differences between two 
levels of analysis, however, Schwartz appears to fail to incorporate the results from different 




levels of analysis more systematically despite the fact that he has used his own large scale 
cross-cultural survey data. 
Inglehart has clarified what involves the aggregate level analysis of culture and when we 
need it. In doing so, he corrected the widespread misconception about ecological fallacy. 
According to Inglehart, the fact that culture consists of individuals does not invalidate any 
findings about political, socio-economic implications of culture without supporting evidence 
at the individual level. In other words, he made a convincing case that some relations are 
entirely ecological and only exist at the aggregate level as ecological reality and thus does 
not need empirical support from the individual level data. For example, democracy exists 
only at the aggregate level so the assumption that the beliefs of individuals affect democracy 
only mean that aggregations of these beliefs – i.e., cultural level mass beliefs – affect 
democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2003; Welzel and Inglehart, 2007). 
In sum, many students of culture agree that we need separate constructs and approaches, 
both theoretically and empirically, depending on the level of analysis in the study of culture. 
Considering the implications of the dominance of collective oriented definitions of culture 
for the psychological approaches, the effort of distinct, conceptual and operational 
definitions of culture has been in the right direction. Yet they rarely seem to have attempted 
to incorporate the information gained at different levels so far. In other words, it appears that 
the choice of analysis for the empirical study of culture has been limited to either the 
individual or the aggregate level, avoiding fallacies of cross-level inference, that is, 
ecological or individual fallacy. 
That being said, I argue that students of political culture need to take advantage of the 
multilevel modeling (MLM), or in which the cultural as well as the individual level 
information is incorporated in the same model to explain individual level attitude and 
behavior. This is a new generation analytic technique in cross-cultural psychology that takes 
account of the fact that individuals within the same context – in this case, the same nation – 
tend to be more homogeneous or clustered to use the terminology of MLM than others within 
different contexts.
6
 In addition, it accounts for the fact that in this type of nested data 
structure, the variations at the individual level should be explained by the information at the 
contextual level as well as at the same individual level (Oyserman and Uskul, 2008).  
The multilevel approach is most appropriate for the empirical analysis of political culture 
since it is reasonable to assume that political values, attitudes, and behavior of the 
individuals in the same country are more homogenous than others in different countries 
considering that they are raised under the same educational system and share the same 
historical experiences. Hofstede in fact suggested that MLM could be used to avoid both 
types of cross-level fallacies and could “provide crucial insights into the working of social 
systems” (2001: 17). 
 
6.2 Contrasting Constructs of Individualism and Collectivism 
 
In the study of individualism and collectivism, one of the most important theoretical 
questions that has profound methodological implications is whether the concepts of 
individualism and collectivism is bipolar and opposite or domain specific and orthogonal 
(Oyserman et al., 2002a). In other words, students of culture have debated whether values, 
                                                          
6  Multilevel modeling is often referred to as Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), the statistical 
analysis that deals with this type of the nested hierarchical data structure. 
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attitudes, behaviors of individualists are directly opposite to those of collectivist. Thus, 
bipolar opposition granted, if you know someone is individualistic then you can safely 
assume that he or she is not collectivistic. At the cultural level, they have debated whether 
knowing how collectivistic a country is allows one to predict how individualistic it is. 
I propose that cross-cultural psychologists conceptualize and operationalize individualism 
and collectivism as multidimensional constructs at the individual level and as unidimensional 
and bipolar ones at the cultural level. A the individual level, the multidimensionality of the 
constructs have been supported theoretically by Triandis’ arguments on multiple key 
attributes and the orthogonal classification of the constructs, Schwartz’s circumplex structure 
of values subsuming individualism and collectivism, and Oyserman et al.’s content analysis 
of the existing scales. The target-specific nature of collectivism also supports the domain 
specific conceptualization of the construct. Thus, Oyserman and her associate observed that 
“it is probably more accurate to conceptualize IND and COL as worldviews that differ in the 
issues they make salient” (2002a: 5). In other words, individuals can hold two seemingly 
contrasting cultural values at the same time and the activation of either value depends on the 
situation and the issue content they deal with. Hofstede, who initiated the bipolar approach at 
the cultural level, also supported a multidimensional model at the individual level (1994; 
2001: 215-216).  
At the cultural level, it would be more reasonable to conceptualize individualism and 
collectivism as unidimensional since such collective attributes would be robust to short-term, 
situational cues unlike individual cultural values as the multidimensionality at the individual 
level suggests. In addition, the bipolar unidimensional approach at the cultural level has to do 
with the way students of culture have identified the dimensions of cultural syndromes. 
According to Oyserman and her associates (2002a: 8-9), the bipolar single dimension 
approach seems to have been more popular even among researchers studying psychological 
implications of these cultural syndromes. The majority of the 170 studies included in their 
meta-analysis measured only one of the constructs. 
 
6.3 External Validity  
 
As suggested by Oyserman et al. (2002a), the study of cross-cultural psychology has been 
vulnerable to the issue of external validity, that is, whether we can generalize the findings 
from the research to the real world.  
The criticism has been valid to some extent. The vast majority of empirical studies of 
culture have compared samples from only two or three cultures, usually operationalized as 
different nations (Schwartz, 1994; Oyserman et al., 2002a). The study of comparative 
political behavior, where cross-cultural research of individualism and collectivism such as 
this paper calls for, has also had the similar issue. According to Jennings (2007), cross-
national studies for investigating contextual effects have been confined to a small number of 
countries since the pioneering five-nation study of The Civic Culture. In addition, cross-
national comparisons that examine individual-level effects typically involve convenience 
samples of college students, many of them participate in the study while attending a 
psychology course (Oyserman et al., 2002a). Moreover, experiment, preferred research 
method in psychology especially for establishing causality at the individual level, has often 
been subject to the similar criticism of generalizability because of its highly contrived lab 
settings.  
The problems of the small-n countries/cultures, unrepresentative samples are inevitable 




due to the limited research resources. Furthermore, since obviously cultural or national level 
variables cannot be manipulated, experimental methods can only be applied to the individual 
level analysis. One should also acknowledge the fact that these problems themselves will not 
make any findings of cross-cultural studies that utilize at least one of these methods not 
generalizable or invalid. As suggested by Oyserman and her associates’ extensive meta-
analysis (2002a), there is not the only one way but exist multiple ways, to learn the scientific 
truth. Any findings from one research method can be and must be verified by others from 
different methods. Hofstede also advocated such a pluralistic method tradition, that is, 
“methodological triangulation” (2001: 5). 
To address the issue of the generalizability of the research findings in the spirit of 
methodological triangulation, I maintain that we need to take advantage of a large scale 
cross-national survey that is far more representative, in terms of the number of countries and 
respondents, and the way samples are selected. For example, we have, among others, 
Hofstede’s IBM data expanded by Bond and his colleagues, the Schwartz Value Survey 
(SVS), Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) research 
program, and the World Values Survey (WVS) available for this purpose. 
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